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Abstract
This paper studies recent developments in Australian and US law permitting compensation for defrauded
investors. For insolvent companies, these developments have drawn attention to the possibility of investor
claims being satisfied on parity with the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors. This paper proposes that
such a shift may be justified on the basis of a modern perspective of the principles underpinning corporate
law. However, account must also be taken of the more practical implications which may hinder a widespread
acceptance of parity.
Introduction
Anotable development in the field of investor protection law over the past few years hasbeen the extension of the concept of rateable (or pari passu) distribution within the
class of ordinary unsecured creditors to accommodate the interests of defrauded
shareholders.1 This is due to the phenomenon of shareholder claims, defined as claims for
damages against a company by a subscriber for or purchaser of its shares, where the
claimant relies upon misleading or deceptive conduct of the company, or other wrongful
acts or omissions on its part as being causative of his or her loss.2 At first glance, it would
seem that such an approach is contrary to the rule that debts owed to a member of a
company in his or her capacity as such (qua member) may not be satisfied before the claims
of other creditors have been met.3 This enforces the principle that:
. . . the rights of members as members come last, i.e. rights founded on the
statutory contract are, as the price of limited liability, subordinated to the rights
* Lecturer in Law, University of Surrey, UK. I am grateful to my colleague Alison Clarke for her insightful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. A condensed version of this paper was presented at the Society
of Legal Scholars’ annual conference in September 2011: I am indebted to the participants of the subject
session for their helpful suggestions. I take responsibility for any errors.
1 See landmark decision of Australia’s highest court in Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic [2007] HCA 1; and
changes brought about in US by Sarbanes–Oxley Act – both discussed below. The Gwalia judgment has led
Australian Federal Government to introduce new legislation, also discussed below.
2 Sons of Gwalia [2007] HCA 1, para. 34.
3 See, for example, s. 74(2)(f) of the UK Insolvency Act 1986. See, however, s. 655 Companies Act 2006 – a
shareholder’s claim against the company for damages or other compensation is not barred by mere fact of his
or her ownership of (or entitlement to) shares in the company.
of creditors based on other legal causes of action. The rationale . . . is to ensure
that the rights of members as such do not compete with the rights of the general
body of creditors.4
In English law, this signals a distinction which is made in upholding shareholder claims,
between sums claimed qua member arising from the statutory contract, and claims in respect
of which membership is an essential qualification for acquiring the claim but not the
foundation of the cause of action.5 On the other hand, the approaches recently adopted in
the US and in Australia drive us to review the justifications for the established rule in the
light of modern perspectives of corporate relationships. It is a matter of interest to lawyers
in other jurisdictions, as the financial downturn has resulted in claims for securities loss
being pursued against companies in foreign courts, particularly in the US.6 These
developments also provide an important insight into the intersection between the
insolvency distribution rules and market regulation. These underlying questions, and the
connection between them, are helpfully condensed in this extract from the decision of the
High Court of Australia in the matter of Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic:
[M]odern legislation . . . has extended greatly the scope for “shareholder claims”
against corporations, with consequences for ordinary creditors who may find
themselves, in an insolvency, proving in competition with members now armed
with statutory rights. Corporate regulation has become more intensive, and
legislatures have imposed on companies and their officers obligations, breach of
which may sound in damages, for the protection of members of the public who
deal in shares and other securities. This raises issues of legislative policy. On the
one hand, extending the range of claims by shareholders is likely to be at the
expense of ordinary creditors. The spectre of insolvency stands behind
corporate regulation. Legislation that confers rights of damages upon
shareholders necessarily increases the number of potential creditors in a winding
up. Such an increase normally will be at the expense of those who previously
would have shared in the available assets. On the other hand, since the need for
protection of investors often arises only in the event of insolvency, such
protection may be illusory if the claims of those who are given the apparent
benefit of the protection are subordinated to the claims of ordinary creditors.7
The policy challenge described in this statement becomes more apparent when
considered against the backdrop of the established justifications for subordinating
shareholder claims in insolvency.
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4 Soden v British & Commonwealth Holdings plc [1998] AC 298, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson, para. 324 (original
emphasis). The statutory contract referred to is now set out in s. 33(1) of the UK Companies Act 2006
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6 See, for instance, M Herman, “Pensioners hire Cherie Blair to sue Sir Fred Goodwin and RBS”, The Times,
16 March 2009; C Seib and M Waller, “Goldman Sachs case opens lawsuit floodgates on Wall Street”, The
Times, 18 April 2010. However, the US Supreme Court’s recent decision in Morrison v National Australia Bank
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a foreign exchange) may strongly limit the number of claims with a foreign element in future.
7 [2007] HCA 1, para. 18, per Gleeson CJ.
The basis for subordinating shareholder claims in insolvency
Historically, the subordination of shareholder claims in insolvency arose from the necessity
to adapt laws to the creditors of corporations as distinct from the creditors of individual
bankrupts.8 This concern was reflected in two principles: firstly, that corporate debts should
be paid before distributions are made amongst shareholders – a rule which has its origins
in the conception of corporate assets as a trust fund for creditors.9 The second was the
notion that a shareholder is precluded from denying his or her liability to contribute to the
assets of an insolvent company on the ground that the shareholder was induced to buy the
shares by fraud.10 In modern insolvency law shareholders are referred to as the “cushion on
which all other creditors rest”,11 and, accordingly, equity claims in general are subordinated
to the payment of other creditors. The justifications for subordination may be seen to be
founded on the perception of this cushion, and can broadly be categorised as being based
on contract, creditor reliance and equity. Contractually, the relationship between the
shareholder and the company entails that the shareholder as a member undertakes to
contribute a certain amount in satisfaction of its debts and liabilities, and it is arguably
inconsistent with this position to permit the shareholder to lay claim to any part of those
assets while external creditors remain unpaid.12 However, where a contract to purchase
shares is induced by fraud, it is voidable13 and shareholders are not barred from pursuing
their remedies against the company by reason of their membership.14 The reliance aspect
expresses the need, in ascribing a lower priority to the shareholder’s contractual claims or
damages award, to take account of the relative positions of shareholders and creditors. In
particular, whereas shareholders enjoy the benefits of participation in the success or
prosperity of an enterprise, creditors extend credit to an entity in (at least partial) reliance
upon their perception of the equity “cushion” provided by the shareholders’ investments,
and would be prejudiced by a dilution of the capital reserves available to repay them if these
were to be applied equally to the payment of shareholders.15 In an insolvency situation,
where there clearly remains no prospect of recovery from the equity cushion, the creditors
shift the focus of their reliance to the expectation of priority over equity claims when the
debtor’s estate is divided up.16 From the perspective of achieving equity, subordination
furthermore ensures that innocent creditors do not bear the economic burden of
shareholder fraud remedies against the debtor company, which was involved in the
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8 E S Hunt, “The trust fund theory and some substitutes for it” (1902) 12 Yale LJ 63.
9 Wood v Dummer 3 Mason 309. Hunt, “The trust fund”, n. 8 above, discusses whether the trust applies to a
solvent company, or if it is limited to insolvent bodies (pp. 73–4).
10 Oakes v Turquand [1861–73] All ER Rep 738.
11 P Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2008), pp. 5–19.
12 Houldsworth v City of Glasgow Bank [1874–80] All ER 333, at 335; In re Addlestone Linoleum Co (1887) 37 Ch D
191 at 206; R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency 3rd edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), p. 199.
13 Oakes v Turquand [1861–73] All ER Rep 738.
14 See, for instance, UK Companies Act 2006, s. 655: “A person is not debarred from obtaining damages or other
compensation from a company by reason only of his holding or having held shares in the company or any
right to apply or subscribe for shares or to be included in the company’s register of members in respect of
shares.”
15 Observed by Ebel J in Re Geneva Steel Co (2002) 281 F3d 1173 at 1176 and 1179, a judgment in which the
history of §510(b) of the US Bankruptcy Code is comprehensively discussed (Title 11, Chapter 11, USC). As
will be seen below, this provision expressly subordinates claims for rescission or damages arising from the
purchase or sale of shares, to payment of secured and unsecured creditors. See also M E Sprouse, “A collision
of fairness: Sarbanes–Oxley and s. 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code” (2005) 24–8 American Bankruptcy Institute
Journal 8. See also K B Davis, “The status of defrauded securityholders in corporate bankruptcy” (1983) 1
Duke Law Journal 1, pp. 11–12.
16 Davis, “The status”, n. 15 above, pp. 19–22.
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wrongdoing and may have benefited from it.17 A party who has irrevocably adopted the
liabilities of a shareholder cannot appear to claim out of the debtor company’s assets a sum
not included in the debts and liabilities, to the payment of which he or she as a shareholder,
had agreed that those assets should be devoted.18 “Equity” may also be said to operate in
the sense of recognising the extinction of shareholders’ privileged status on the insolvency
of a company:
Shareholders’ ample and superior statutory rights, their voluntary abdication of
control over their investment in favour of their appointees, the directors, who
have large statutory and constitutional discretions and obligations in the
application of it, their rights of intervention, their rights to proceed against the
directors personally as well as the company in some circumstances, their
statutorily mandated limited liability, especially that, and their rights to participate
in the bounty of any successes, sit uncomfortably with the notion that s 563A
gives them equal billing, on the failure of the company, with ordinary creditors.19
Thus, an analysis of the relationship between shareholders and the company, between
the creditors and the company, and between creditors and shareholders leads to the
conclusion that subordination of shareholder claims is justified on contractual and equitable
grounds. This is so although insolvency law in general20 and particularly the principle of pro
rata distribution21 do not – as a broad rule – allow claims to be favoured on the basis of
factors such as their origin or relative merits, the nature of the claimant or its relationship
with the debtor. With respect to claims for loss resulting from the sale or purchase of the
debtor company’s shares, the question arises whether a merger should be allowed between
the interests of unsecured creditors as debt-holders and the interests of shareholders as
contractual or tort claimants. Or, on the other hand, if a separation should be maintained
on the basis of their respective identities and the terms on which they are deemed to have
contracted with the corporate debtor. The latter approach allows some consistency to be
achieved in treating shareholders as shareholders regardless of whether their entitlement in
a particular case is analogous to that of creditors, and continuing to accord priority to the
creditors. The experience of the US and Australia, outlined below, shows how investor
interests may encroach on the distribution rights of creditors, either as a result of legislative
developments or by means of judicial construction.
Mandatory subordination in the United States and the impact of the
Sarbanes–Oxley Fair Funds requirement
In the United States Bankruptcy Code, the main principle governing distribution in
Chapter 7 liquidations as well as Chapter 11 reorganisations is that of “absolute priority”,
whereby claims that are classed as being of a higher priority are entitled to payment in full
before the lower priority claims are met.22 The Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 procedures are
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17 Davis, “The status”, n. 15 above, at p. 16.
18 In re Addlestone Linoleum Co (1887) 37 Ch D 191, at 205.
19 Callinan J’s dissenting judgment in Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic, n. 1 above, para. 242, referring to s. 563A
of the Australian Corporations Act 2001: “Payment of a debt owed by a company to a person in the person’s
capacity as a member of the company, whether by way of dividends, profits or otherwise, is to be postponed
until all debts owed to, or claims made by, persons otherwise than as members of the company have been
satisfied.”
20 Davis, “The status”, n. 15 above, pp. 16–18.
21 Also known as the pari passu principle – see M Bridge, “Collectivity, management of estates and the pari passu
principle in winding-up” in J Armour and H Bennett (eds), Vulnerable Transactions in Corporate Insolvency
(Oxford: Hart 2003), ch. 1, para. 1.2.
22 Title 11, Chapter 7, USC §726; and Title 11, Chapter 11, USC §1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
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furthermore connected by the inclusion, among the requirements for a court to confirm a
Chapter 11 plan, of a stipulation that claimants shall receive under the plan an amount no
less than they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation.23 Consequently, the enforcement of
the priority structure set out in Chapter 7 is essential for the proper confirmation of a
Chapter 11 reorganisation plan.24
In terms of this priority structure, the claims of unsecured creditors are to be satisfied
before those of shareholders. Among the ordinary (non-preferential) unsecured creditors,
payment of their claims is to be made on a pro rata basis.25 Thus, pari passu treatment
operates within the framework of absolute priority, and is acknowledged as the “equality of
distribution principle”.26 Of particular interest is §510(b) of the Code which provides that
claims for the rescission of a purchase or sale of a security of the debtor company, or
damages arising from the purchase or sale thereof, or claims for reimbursement or
contribution for a sale or purchase, are subordinated to the payment of secured and
unsecured claims. By this rule of mandatory subordination, shareholders are precluded
from recovering from the company in respect of claims arising in contract or tort on parity
with unsecured creditors.27 The possibility of this form of shareholder elevation is clearly
excluded, and the equality of distribution principle continues to apply as between the
general creditors.
With the introduction of the American Competitiveness and Corporate Accountability
Act (referred to herein as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act),28 in particular its Fair Funds provision
§308(a), this distribution regime has undergone a modification, as the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) is entitled to direct that civil penalties recovered in respect of
securities violations be added to a disgorgement fund for the benefit of victims of such
violations. The primary purpose of disgorgement is to deter violations of the securities laws
by depriving violators of their illegal profits.29 Thus, although disgorged funds may often
go to compensate securities fraud victims for their losses, such compensation is a distinctly
secondary goal, and the measure of disgorgement need not be tied to the losses suffered by
defrauded investors.30 Civil penalties further the deterrent role of disgorgement by allowing
the SEC to impose a financial penalty which may amount to the gross monetary gain from
the securities fraud.31 Consequently, neither mechanism entails the enforcement or
collection of a debt as such.
A change has come about in that, while the SEC formerly had only discretion to
distribute recoveries from disgorgement to injured investors and was obliged to transmit
civil penalties to the US Treasury,32 the Fair Funds provision now permits it to add the civil
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23 Title 11, Chapter 11, USC §1129(A)(7)(ii).
24 D A Henry, “Subordinating subordination: WorldCom and the effect of Sarbanes–Oxley’s Fair Funds
provision on distributions in bankruptcy” (2004) 21 Bankruptcy Developments Journal 259, p. 270.
25 Title 11, Chapter 7, USC §726(b).
26 Z Christensen, “The Fair Funds for Investors provision of Sarbanes–Oxley: is it unfair to the creditors of a
bankrupt debtor?” (2005) University of Illinois Law Review 339, p. 347.
27 Henry, “Subordinating subordination”, n. 24 above, p. 272.
28 2002 Pub L No 107–204, 116 Stat. 745.
29 SEC v Fischbach Corporation, 1333 F3d 170, at 175. See also The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC protects investors,
maintains market integrity, and facilitates capital formation, United States SEC, available at www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml.
30 SEC v Fischbach Corporation, 1333 F3d 170, at 175–6.
31 Securities Enforcement Remedies Act and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, 15 USC §78u(d)(3).
32 See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom Inc. v SEC (2006) 467 F3d 73, at 81–2, and 15 USC
§77t(d)(3)(A).
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penalties proceeds to the disgorged funds and distribute these monies to the victims of the
fraud. It is recognised that this has made “another potentially large category of funds
available for compensation”.33 This enhanced power of the SEC supports the intention
underlying the Act, to “protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws”34 and “crack down on fraud and
wrongdoing”.35 Although the operation of the provision is not limited to companies that
are insolvent, the application of the Fair Funds term in a bankruptcy has meant that a
shareholder whose claim against the debtor company falls for mandatory subordination in
terms of §510(b) may be eligible to receive compensation as a victim of fraud pari passu with
unsecured creditors.36 In other words, the SEC’s share in the bankruptcy estate as a general
unsecured creditor may be distributed to the defrauded shareholders rather than being paid
over to the US Treasury.37 In this way, the absolute priority rule is bypassed and, to the
extent that the distinguishable (and in some respects opposing) interests of shareholders
and unsecured creditors are unusually aligned,38 its implications for pari passu treatment
merit consideration.
In terms of general insolvency principles, this is clearly a departure from the established
framework39 whereby the payment of equity debts is made after distribution to unsecured
creditors. In light of the specific requirement of mandatory subordination of shareholder
claims under the US Bankruptcy Code, whereby even claims going to the root of the
shareholders’ relationship with the debtor company40 and of a potentially tortious nature
are categorised as equity claims, this development is even more striking. Furthermore, in the
field of corporate rescue law, as compared with the traditional focus of a reorganisation
process, such as Chapter 11, on the debtor’s financial circumstances and recovery
prospects,41 Fair Funds uniquely diverts attention towards the obligation to take account of
the needs of a particular group of creditors.
The consequences of implementing the Fair Funds provision §308(a) in bankruptcy
were recognised by Rakoff J in assessing the penalty of the SEC in its case against
WorldCom Inc.42 He affirmed that, under the bankruptcy laws, the SEC’s penalty claim was
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33 V Winship, “Fair Funds and the SEC’s compensation of injured investors” (2008) 60 Florida Law Review 1103,
p. 1110. She argues, moreover, that since the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, penalties serve the dual
purpose of deterring securities law violations and compensating harmed investors (p. 1118).
34 Preamble to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act.
35 Statement of President George W Bush on House of Representatives Action on the proposed
“Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002”, 25 July 2002.
36 Christensen, “Fair Funds”, n. 26 above, illustrates this by example of a tort claim by the purchaser of an equity
security that arises from the debtor’s fraudulent activity. In the absence of a Fair Funds requirement and by
virtue of mandatory subordination, this claim would not achieve the same status as a general unsecured claim
even though in principle a holder of a tort claim would obtain the status of a general unsecured creditor:
p. 348.
37 Ibid. pp. 353–4.
38 Sprouse, “A collision”, n. 15 above, notes that this distribution may be received by the stockholder claimant
“to the direct detriment of unsecured creditors and in potential contravention of provisions of the Code,
including §510(b) and the ‘absolute priority rule’”: p. 8.
39 See, generally, Wood, Law and Practice, n. 11 above, at 5-02, and in particular Title 11, Chapter 7, USC §726(a),
which sets out the order of priority for claims, subject to the requirement of mandatory subordination
according to §510.
40 For instance, whether the purchase of shares is tainted by misrepresentation.
41 A Keay and P Walton, Insolvency Law: Corporate and personal 2nd edn (Bristol: Jordans 2008), para. 1.3.
42 SEC v WorldCom Inc., 273 F Supp 2d 431, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
affirmed on appeal: Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom Inc. v SEC 467 F3d 73 (2006) (US
Court of Appeals for 2nd Circuit).
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treated simply as another claim by one of many unsecured creditors.43 However, he
acknowledged that while §308(a) gave the SEC an opportunity to pay any penalty it
recovered to shareholder victims rather than to the US Treasury, it could not properly
premise the size of its penalty on the basis of such disbursement. This move would
arguably run afoul of the mandatory subordination provisions of the Code, given that there
was no suggestion in §308(a) that Congress intended to accord a greater priority to
shareholders in bankruptcy than they had previously enjoyed. Rakoff J, however,
considered it to be acceptable for the SEC to give its penalty recovery to shareholder victims
or take some account of shareholder loss in formulating the size and nature of its penalty.44
The approved settlement provided that the penalty recoveries would be directed to
defrauded shareholders in accordance with the Fair Funds provision.
Rakoff J’s decision was upheld on appeal following objections by an official committee
of WorldCom’s unsecured creditors (the Committee) to the exercise of the district court’s
discretion in approving the plan.45 The Committee took issue with the SEC’s distribution
plan on the ground that, in the absence of sufficient funds to compensate all the victims of
WorldCom’s fraud, several groups of investors were excluded from sharing in the amount
collected from WorldCom. Among the investors excluded were those who had recovered
36 per cent or more on their claims under the Chapter 11 reorganisation plan or through
the sale of their securities, and investors who made a net profit on their combined purchase
and sales of WorldCom securities during the period in which the fraud occurred. The
Committee further contended that the ordinary judicial test for reviewing the distribution
of disgorged profits – that is whether the distribution was conducted in a “fair and
reasonable” manner46 – should not apply to the review of Fair Funds plans. The
Committee especially objected to the exclusion of creditors who had received more than
36 per cent in the bankruptcy proceedings or through the sale of their WorldCom securities
as flying “in the face of the strong public policy that puts the rights of bondholders ahead
of those of shareholders”.47 With regard to the implications for the relationship between
creditors, the appeal Court recognised, in the same manner as the district court, the tension
between the priority assigned to claims under the Bankruptcy Code and the Fair Funds
provision, which empowered the SEC to distribute funds among injured investors outside
the bankruptcy proceeding.48 The court saw no indication in the Fair Funds provision,
however, that the SEC must follow the Bankruptcy Code’s claim priorities when developing
a distribution plan, and it considered that in the absence of such an indication it was not its
role to mitigate this tension.49 It found that the district court was required only to determine
that the SEC’s distribution plan fairly and reasonably distributed limited Fair Fund proceeds
among potential claimants, and it had properly exercised its discretion in approving the
plan.50 In this way, a distribution outcome in the context of bankruptcy which did not
accord with the equality of distribution principle (or pari passu treatment) was rendered
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43 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom Inc. v SEC 467 F3d 73 (2006) (US Court of Appeals for
2nd Circuit), p. 434.
44 Ibid. emphasis added. In the result, the penalty proposed and approved by the court was $750 million, 75
times greater than any prior such penalty.
45 Ibid. The question whether the committee had exceeded its statutory authority as a creditors’ committee in
bringing the proceedings was argued before the court, pp. 77–81. Provision governing powers of creditors’
committees: Title 11, Chapter 11, USC §1103.
46 The test applied in the court a quo: SEC v WorldCom Inc., n. 42 above.
47 Official Committee, n. 42 above, p. 85.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid. p. 85.
50 Ibid.
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acceptable by framing the issue for resolution not as whether the SEC was constrained to
observe the Bankruptcy Code’s priorities in making distributions; but rather by inquiring
whether it fell outside the scope of the SEC’s authority to make distributions that were
inconsistent with such priorities.
The actual compromise and settlement between WorldCom and the SEC was approved
by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York.51 Gonzalez J refrained
from deciding whether the ultimate distribution to securities holders contemplated by the
settlement violated the absolute priority rule and mandatory subordination under the Code.
In his opinion, even if this were found to be the correct legal interpretation from a
bankruptcy standpoint, there remained a number of legal issues to be addressed. The nature
of these issues, as well as any other issues that may be raised in litigation to subordinate the
claim, was such as to furnish sufficient doubt as to the outcome of any litigation to
subordinate the claim of the securities holders. He took this uncertainty among other
factors as providing support for the settlement, and went further to state that in considering
the approval of a settlement the court was not required to resolve the “underlying legal
issues” related to the settlement.52 In the court’s determination, the settlement fell within
the range of reasonableness and was fair and equitable and in the best interests of the
debtors’ estates.53 As noted above, the mere fact of inconsistency with the absolute priority
rule did not influence the court against approving the settlement, and this incompatibility
did not have a bearing on the “fairness and reasonableness” of the settlement that had been
reached – it was acknowledged as constituting no more than a legal issue and was thus
separable from the matters to be taken account of in sanctioning the settlement.
This reluctance to resolve the contradiction between approving a settlement with the
SEC, whereby a victims’ restitution fund would be established from the settlement
proceeds, and the likelihood that the distribution of the same monies would potentially
allow a division contrary to §510(b) and pari passu distribution among ordinary unsecured
creditors was echoed in Re Adelphia Communications.54 Gerber J acknowledged that the
victims’ restitution fund would be distributed largely to victims who were equity security
holders or investors of debt securities who would find themselves subordinated under
§510(b) if they asserted claims in Chapter 11 cases. But he did not consider this to be a
satisfactory basis for disapproving the settlement, as, firstly, these parties would not be
sharing in the assets of the estate but under a plan created and owned by the government;
and, secondly, the uncertainty surrounding the disbursement of Fair Funds vis-à-vis the
absolute priority rule could be taken as supporting the view that settlement would be
appropriate in the circumstances.55 It is strongly indicative of the very real difficulty that the
courts have faced in these matters that as with Gonzalez J’s judgment in the WorldCom
matter, Gerber J took a negative element – namely the uncertainty arising from
implementing a Fair Funds distribution in the light of the absolute priority structure – as
evidence of the desirability of a settlement.
It may be seen that the legislature’s omission to reconcile the effect of the Fair Funds
requirement with the current bankruptcy structure has been matched by the judicial
demurral highlighted above. The imperative of facilitating a settlement in the cases outlined
above has enabled the courts to manoeuvre around the difficulty of making a choice
between the competing objectives of eliminating fraud and preserving the established
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53 Ibid.
54 In re Adelphia Communications Corporation (2005) 327 BR 143.
55 Ibid. pp. 168–71.
bankruptcy distribution scheme. Consequently, no views have emerged as to which is to be
upheld or promoted over the other, and this underscores the uncertainty attendant on the
conception of pari passu treatment as a matter of public policy:56 it does not anticipate
situations where having regard to the public interest might lead to the conclusion that the
enforcement of equal treatment should be extended to non-creditor parties. The apparent
inconsistency between §510(b) of the Code and the Fair Funds provision has been widely
noted,57 and in the absence of any statutory indication as to whether the application of the
Fair Funds provision should alter the established distributional priority scheme in the
Bankruptcy Code,58 commentators have advanced some persuasive arguments regarding
whether these dissonances should be viewed in a positive or negative light. Before these
arguments may be considered in greater detail, it is necessary to introduce the developments
in Australian law which temporarily produced a similar outcome.
Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic in Australia: the High Court’s
decision and its consequences
Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic is a recent decision of Australia’s highest court,59 the salient
facts of which are as follows. In August 2004, Mr Margaretic (M) bought 20,000 fully paid
ordinary shares in the capital of Sons of Gwalia Ltd (Gwalia). The company was listed on
the Australia Stock Exchange and it was from this market that M made his purchase. A few
days after M was entered on the register of the company’s members, administrators were
appointed to distribute the assets of the company as in a winding-up.60 Upon the
appointment of the administrators, the Gwalia shares bought by M became completely
worthless. M claimed compensation from Gwalia, alleging a breach of the securities laws.
The administrators of Gwalia sought to prevent him from proving his claim in the deed of
company arrangement as a creditor, rather than a member. Under s. 563A of the Australia
Corporations Act 2001:
Payment of a debt owed by a company to a person in the person’s capacity as a
member of the company, whether by way of dividends, profits or otherwise, is
to be postponed until all debts owed to, or claims made by, persons otherwise
than as members of the company have been satisfied.61
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57 Christensen, “Fair Funds”, n. 26 above; Sprouse, “A collision”, n. 15 above; and Henry, “Subordinating
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(2007) 16 International Insolvency Review 181.
58 Christensen, “Fair Funds”, n. 26 above, pp. 369–75.
59 Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic [2007] HCA 1. Due to the constraints of space, the procedural history of the
litigation is not set out in this paper. For a helpful summary, combined with a detailed analysis of the High
Court judgment, see A Hargovan and J Harris, “The shifting balance of shareholders’ interests in insolvency:
evolution or revolution?” (2007) 31 Melbourne University Law Review 591.
60 Under s. 463A(1) of the Corporations Act 2001.
61 Although the matter was argued on the basis that the issue for decision turned on the proper construction of
s. 563A, this was reinforced by cl. 4(2)(d) of the deed of company arrangement entered into by Gwalia: “For
the avoidance of doubt, payment of any debts or liabilities owed by the Company to Members in the
Members’ capacity as a member of the Company, whether by way of dividends, profits or otherwise are, to
the extent contemplated by Section 563A of the [Corporations Act 2001] and the general law, to be postponed
until all debts owed to, or claims made by, Creditors have been satisfied.”
The questions for determination were therefore whether M’s claim was a provable debt,
and if so whether it ranked for payment with non-shareholder creditors, or was postponed
to the satisfaction of their claims. Its ranking with non-shareholder creditors would depend
on whether M’s claim fell within the s. 563A subordination of debts owed to a member as
a member. Thus, although there is no statutory provision equivalent to §510(b) of the US
Bankruptcy Code prescribing mandatory subordination of the sort of claim brought by M,
attention focused on the nature of the debts which could be considered as owing to a
person qua member under s. 563A.
Two important factors were noted that had a bearing on this case. The first was the
historical significance of s. 563A, which could be traced back to a time when the separate
legal personality of a company had not been fully recognised, and the distinction between
corporations and partnerships was less marked. It was an established rule of partnership
law that a partner in a bankrupt firm could not prove in competition with debts of outside
creditors upon a dissolution, as this would permit him or her to diminish partnership assets
to the prejudice of the firm’s creditors, who were also his or her own creditors. This rule
now formed part of the conception of a company’s existence as an entity separate from its
members.62 Another influential consideration, relevant to the raising and maintenance of
capital, was the established principle that the creditors of a company which is being wound
up have a right to look to the paid-up capital as the fund out of which their debts are to be
discharged.63 This common law principle had its origins in the nineteenth century,64 and
had been given statutory effect in successive Companies Acts. These factors provided the
background to the operation of s. 563A and demonstrated the wider implications of the
decision, beyond the resolution of this matter.
The majority of the High Court concluded that M’s claim was not a debt owed to him
in his “capacity as a member” of Gwalia, whether by way of dividends, profits or otherwise.
Accordingly, the claim was not to be postponed by s. 563A of the Corporations Act 2001
to claims made by “persons otherwise than as members of the company”. In determining
whether the type of claim brought by M fell to be subordinated under s. 563A, analysis
centred on the interpretation of the phrase “in the person’s capacity as a member of the
company”. The provision itself did not manifest any clear legislative policy, as compared
with the mandatory subordination provision §510(b) of the US Bankruptcy Code.
However, it was clear to the court that it did not embody a general policy that “members
come last” in an insolvency:
On the contrary, by distinguishing between debts owed to a member in the
capacity as a member and debts owed to a member otherwise than in such a
capacity [s. 563A] rejects such a general policy.65
The criteria for subordination were thus based on the character of the debt rather than
the identity of the claimant. In this case, the claim made by M was not founded on any rights
he obtained or obligations incurred by virtue of his membership of Gwalia. M did not seek
to recover any paid-up capital or to avoid any liability to contribute to the company’s capital.
His membership of the company was not definitive of the capacity in which he made his
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64 Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App Cas 409.
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claim, and the obligation which he sought to enforce was not an obligation which the
Corporations Act created in favour of a company’s members. The obligations arose by
virtue of Gwalia’s conduct in relation to the statutory duties alleged to have been breached
– in particular the prohibition against engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct – rather
than from a legislative prescription of the rights and duties of company members. Gwalia’s
contravention of “statutory norms of behaviour”66 rendered it liable to provide damages or
other relief at the suit of any person who had suffered, or was likely to suffer, loss and
damage as a result of the contravention. Accordingly, s. 563A did not apply to M’s claim, as
it was not a debt owed to him in his capacity as a member of Gwalia.
Callinan J dissented from this construction of s. 563A. He considered that the scope,
objects and history of the Corporations Act 2001, the language of s. 563A and the
context in which the provision appeared, the relevant case law and the desirability of
maintaining coherence and fairness within the law, all pointed towards the construction
that s. 563A precluded the treatment of M as a creditor on parity with other unsecured
creditors. He drew attention to the conformity of this result with the typical
shareholder/creditor relationship:
. . . up to the point of insolvency, liquidation or administration of a company, its
members enjoy superior opportunities, rights and advantages to creditors, yet the
latter are no less likely to be disadvantaged by deceptive conduct of a company
lying in a failure to comply with the continuous disclosure rules. There can be no
doubt that the financial capacity of a company to satisfy its obligations to all of
those who deal with or rely on it, is a matter of continuing interest and concern
to them.67
He noted that parity would also distort inter-shareholder relationships, given that all
shareholders of Gwalia had been equally wronged and induced by the company to hold on
to their shares. Recent purchasers such as M would gain a large advantage over other, equally
wronged, longer-term members if their claims were accorded the status of non-
membership debts. He thus concluded that M’s claim should be postponed to the
satisfaction of all non-member creditor debts.
It may be seen how defrauded shareholders in the US and Australia respectively found
themselves in similar positions; as a result of the Fair Funds legislation in one jurisdiction and
of judicial construction in the other. Concern arose in Australia over the implications of the
Sons of Gwalia decision, which included its potential to facilitate the participation of equity
holders in insolvencies and workouts; encourage litigation by shareholders or the likely use of
compensation claims as leverage in insolvencies; and an increase in the tendency of banks to
request security when lending to a listed company.68 Notwithstanding the recommendation
by the national Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee not to reverse the effects of
the Sons of Gwalia judgment,69 the Australian government has released draft legislation
overturning the decision. The Corporations Amendment (No 2) Bill 2010 explicitly provides
that claims in relation to the buying, selling, holding or otherwise dealing in shares are to be
ranked equally and paid after satisfaction of all creditors’ claims. The consequences of the
Sons of Gwalia decision with respect to reduced access to debt finance and the increased cost
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69 Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, Shareholder Claims against Insolvent Companies: Implications of the
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and complexity of insolvent administrations, have thus been addressed.70 To this extent, the
debate in Australia regarding the use of the qua-member construction approach to confer
parity on investors appears to be closed. As other jurisdictions take this direct, legislative
approach to clarifying the position, certainty may be expected to dominate this area of law.
However, this does not exclude the potential for mandatory subordination to be apparently
undermined by another legislative instrument which is underpinned by similarly compelling
policy reasons, as borne out by the Sarbanes–Oxley Fair Funds experience. For this reason,
the consideration which follows of the arguments supporting parity focuses principally on
the US position, although it incorporates more general observations which may be relevant
to the legal position in other countries.
Can parity be justified as a progressive move in insolvency distribution?
The Fair Funds provision has been recognised as a positive development on the ground that
distributing the funds of a bankrupt estate to shareholders as tort claimants is essential to
a modern system of corporate governance.71 It reflects an appropriate response to evolving
financial markets,72 in particular, the fact that the interests of creditors and shareholders
have changed since the era during which the theories supporting the mandatory
subordination of shareholder claims were developed.73 It is worth noting that more than a
quarter of a century ago, the argument was already being advanced that the sophistication
in financial law and practice that had evolved since the inception of the subordination
doctrine severely undermined the policy basis for protecting the creditors.74 Shareholders
were seen as constituting a more broadly dispersed group and no longer just a minor
assembly of entrepreneurs and local investors, while creditor groupings had yielded to the
dominance of financial institutions in place of comparatively small trade creditors and
individual debt holders.75 Both modern business creditors and modern shareholders are
seen to have greater resources at their disposal to evaluate a corporation’s financial position,
and a stronger understanding of the factors that affect solvency than they had when
mandatory subordination was first introduced.76 Thus, the comparative abilities of the debt
and equity classes to protect themselves from fraud and to represent their interests
vigorously in a bankruptcy proceeding may be taken to have changed.77 On this view, there
is no conflict between the absolute priority rule and the operation of the Fair Funds
provision in a bankruptcy. Not only is the result entirely in accord with the reality of the
circumstances of creditors and shareholders in current times, it is argued that it also
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represents an acceptance that blanket shareholder subordination is a rigid approach which
can yield unfair outcomes.78
Moving beyond the legal position in the US, there are further broad justifications which
may be identified in favour of elevating shareholder claims. The first of these is that the
inherent dynamism of public policy must extend to a rule such as pari passu. That is to say,
since pari passu has been upheld and applied as being based on public policy,79 and public
policy is based on the current needs of the community,80 in principle the concept of
rateable treatment should be equally malleable to accommodate the effect of the changes in
the relationship between shareholders and creditors in modern times. Indeed, it was
acknowledged, among the arguments for non-subordination preceding the recent Australian
Corporations Amendment Bill, that the positions of shareholders and creditors in an
insolvency are not wholly dissimilar:
[I]n some companies, such as large listed companies, ordinary shareholders, even
institutional shareholders, have limited practical ability to direct the company and
in reality may have no greater power than creditors. They therefore need a
comparable level of protection in an insolvency.81
Since the law develops by perpetually drawing new values and solutions from the life of
the community82 – a feat attained partly through the development of new law, and partly
through standards and principles which are implicit in particular branches of the law such
as “reasonableness” and “public policy”83 – a change of this type is not beyond the realm
of possibility. Moreover, it has been argued that some of a company’s securities violations
may have occurred with the collusion of some of its creditors (albeit that their actions may
not attract specific civil or criminal liability);84 and since trade creditors dealing with such a
company will typically have their invoices paid until the company is on the verge of
insolvency, they are not invariably in the position of parties who have lost everything to a
debtor.85 In the light of all these factors, it would seem inconsistent with the development
of public policy that mandatory subordination should override the possibility of any
payment to defrauded shareholders on the same priority with the unsecured creditors of a
company. It is arguably desirable that the understanding of “equality of distribution” should
evolve in tandem with this re-balancing of the relative positions of creditors and
shareholders. Indeed, remaining faithful to the theoretical conception of the risks assumed
by either grouping would achieve the result that the law pulls in a different direction from
the realities of commerce and, thus, fails to meet the broad goal of public policy to serve
the current needs of the community.
Another factor which should enable the acceptance of pari passu treatment for
defrauded shareholders vis-à-vis unsecured creditors is the notion that companies are social
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83 Ibid.
84 K Cordry, “Categorical subordination: still kicking?” (2006) 24(10) American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 8, p. 51.
85 Ibid.
enterprises86 – their existence is required to produce consequences beneficial to society87
and their activities should accordingly be consonant with the public interest.88 This includes
making profits for the shareholders, which becomes a mechanism for promoting the public
interest, and not an end in itself.89 The classification of companies as social enterprises
entitles the state to intervene in order to safeguard the public interest and ensure
compliance with publicly acceptable ethical standards while they are going concerns.90 On
this basis, it is submitted that this entitlement should reasonably continue into the
insolvency of a company and would be even more pertinent to a reorganisation process
which offers the prospect of survival of a company. The public interest receives protection
through the deterrence of fraud or dishonest behaviour on the part of companies, the
preservation of financial integrity and commercial morality in the market, and the
encouragement of investment or enterprise within society. These concerns were prominent
in the debates leading to the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act91 and, from an
enforcement perspective in particular, actions such as disgorgement and restitution to
injured investors promote economic and social policies, including investor confidence in the
fairness and transparency of securities markets and the deterrence of future violations.92 It
is similarly noted by the Australian legislature that “aggrieved shareholder claims” can act
as a form of private enforcement and help promote the integrity of corporate conduct, to
the benefit of lenders and the market generally, and not only shareholders.93 This resonates
with the view that from a social-enterprise perspective financial impropriety on the part of
managers and inadequate methods of accountability and control are no more to be
tolerated in the corporate sphere than they are within the organs of government.94 Thus,
to accept that insolvency law affects community interests – and is bound to recognise and
safeguard such interests95 – is to extend the social-enterprise/public-interest aspect of a
company’s existence into its demise. A virtuous circle is identifiable between the efficiency
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95 Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee, Cmnd 8558 (1982), paras 198(i), 240 and 1734.
of financial markets resulting from timely and accurate disclosures,96 and a reduced risk of
insolvency as fewer companies fail through poor management and the delayed evidence of
financial difficulty.
Insolvency law jurisprudence97 and policy98 do not deny the relevance of public
interests, but do not answer fully the important question of the extent to which they can
(or should) be accommodated in practice. This has provided fertile ground for debate, in
particular as regards the ability of social interests to impinge on creditors’ rights of
recovery.99 However, in the operation of Sarbanes–Oxley Fair Funds provisions, there is no
direct encroachment on the assets available to unsecured creditors since the SEC recovers
restitution by way of civil penalties and disgorgement levied on a wide body of persons and
pays to the injured investors out of funds that would otherwise be paid to the Treasury.100
The new position is therefore arguably defensible on the ground that it does not interfere
with the equal treatment of creditors per se, as the disbursements are not being made from
funds that they would otherwise be entitled to. In fact, in some cases, the SEC has made
payment of disgorgement or civil penalties to investors via a bankruptcy trustee “for
distribution to creditors, including investors”.101 Although this particular parity may seem
inconsistent with the distribution structure enshrined in the absolute priority rule, in reality
the scope for interference with this structure is reduced by factors pertinent to the
operation of Fair Funds. These include the difficulty faced by the SEC in satisfying strict
judicial requirements for disgorgement orders;102 the power of the SEC to exercise a
discretion to either transmit its recoveries to the Treasury or use them to compensate the
defrauded investors;103 the likelihood that such distributions may be foregone in situations
where it proves not to be cost-effective to make them;104 and the principle that
compensation is not the same as satisfaction of the shareholders’ claims.105 The impact of
the application of Fair Funds on the maintenance of the insolvency distribution structure
may thus not be as profound as it might appear at first glance. It is accordingly proposed
that for insolvency law to be seen to do more than pay lip-service to notions of the
community welfare, it should give perceptible effect to such market-related concerns as
those targeted by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, particularly if this offers the prospect of
reducing the incidence of insolvency in those same markets. Moreover, it would show that
the demands of commercial morality placed upon a company during its lifetime (as
96 CAMAC Report, n. 69 above, para. 2.4.3: “Financial markets are more efficient and less volatile to the extent
that companies provide timely and accurate disclosures about their real financial position and prospects.”
97 See, for instance, A Keay, “Insolvency law: a matter of public interest?” (2000) 51 NILQ 509–34; and V Finch,
Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and principles 2nd edn (Cambridge: CUP 2009), ch. 2.
98 Insolvency Law and Practice, n. 95 above, paras 198(i), 240 and 1734; Law Reform Commission, General Insolvency
Inquiry, Report No 45 (Commonwealth of Australia, 1988), para. 33.
99 The various views have been outlined in some detail by Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law, n. 97 above.
100 See SEC, Report, n. 92 above, pp. 3–5. See also Christensen, “Fair Funds”, n. 26 above, p. 371.
101 SEC, Report, n. 92 above, pp. 10, 12 and 16.
102 Ibid. pp. 18–19 and 23–4. A reading of the Fair Funds provision shows that it cannot operate in the absence
of a disgorgement order, to which the SEC may add civil penalties. There is a danger of a practice developing
whereby the SEC seeks token disgorgement amounts in order to facilitate the distribution of massive
corporate penalties to investors: B Black, “Should the SEC be a collection agency for defrauded investors?”
(2008) 63 Business Lawyer 317, at p. 330.
103 SEC, Report, n. 92 above, pp. 5 and 10–11.
104 Ibid. pp. 3–5.
105 SEC v Fischbach Corporation 1333 F3d 170; and SEC, Report, n. 92 above, pp. 19–20. Winship, “Fair Funds”,
n. 33 above, points out that the losses sustained by investors often dwarf the profits made by the violators and
thus recoveries only represent a fraction of the amounts lost (5–6% in the case of WorldCom), p. 1125.
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evidenced by measures including the Sarbanes–Oxley Act)106 are accorded the same
significance on its insolvency.
Focusing more narrowly on debtor/creditor and inter-creditor relationships, one might
also contend for an acceptance of the improved position of shareholders relative to
unsecured creditors on the ground that creditors generally have a number of alternatives
open to them for the purpose of protecting themselves from the consequences of a
debtor’s insolvency. They are often able to engage in processes to determine the probability
of the debtor’s default in advance; they may obtain personal guarantees or security; require
information which demonstrates the debtor’s continuing creditworthiness, and take
insurance against the risk of default.107 It is noted that apart from their ability to negotiate
for contractual protections, many creditors are well-diversified, in the sense that each debt
contract only has a small impact on their financial status.108 A typical lender is ordinarily
well-situated to absorb the loss associated with the failure of a single business enterprise,
whether this lender takes the form of a trade creditor with numerous customers or a bank
with a large number of corporate borrowers.109 The historical necessity for granting rigid
creditor protections as a quid pro quo for the limited liability enjoyed by shareholders is
therefore distinguished from modern commercial practice, where major business creditors
rely not on the law, but on contract, credit agencies and a host of other self-help measures
to safeguard their interests.110 The reach of creditor influence is evidenced by the fact that
much of the concern regarding the implications of the Sons of Gwalia decision was directed
towards the effects on debt finance for companies. It was perceived that there would be a
reduced availability or increased cost of finance and lenders would be more likely to seek
security or guarantees and impose restrictive conditions on loans.111 Trade creditors would
have increased recourse to retention of title agreements, or factor the added risk of non-
recovery in insolvency into their costs of goods or services.112 It followed, therefore, that
explicit statutory subordination of shareholder claims would facilitate the provision of
credit to companies and, from the standpoint of credit providers, reduce risk premiums and
the imposition of onerous terms and conditions.113
In addition, as between creditors inter se, it is evident that many of the rules of
insolvency distribution governing their relationship are already underpinned by notions of
fairness. Drawing from the example of English insolvency law, in the validation of pre-
insolvency dispositions, transactions which might result in certain creditors being paid in
full at the expense of other creditors who will only receive a dividend may be upheld where
special circumstances exist making such a course desirable in the interests of the unsecured
creditors as a body.114 Similarly, a preferential transaction brought about by proper
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commercial considerations115 or a late floating charge granted to creditors involved in
efforts to revive a struggling company116 have been countenanced, notwithstanding the
consequences for equal treatment. Defences based on the “ordinary course of business”,
entitling creditors to retain benefits from preferential transactions, are also a feature of US
and Australian insolvency law.117 If these differences among creditors may be accepted on
the grounds of fairness, strong support may be lent to a claim by injured shareholders to
similar treatment on the grounds of procedural fairness.118 Procedural fairness relates to
the fairness of the contracting process,119 encompasses the methods which market
participants use to negotiate and formulate transactions, and is breached where the
transactors do not have a chance to make agreements freely and knowingly.120 Where
shareholders have purchased shares on the basis of fraudulent misrepresentations, there is
a clear absence of procedural fairness. Injured investors are required to prove the fact of
the dishonest inducement, together with their dependence thereon and consequent loss, to
the satisfaction of a court in order to be awarded damages121 – a burden conceded to be a
difficult one to discharge, in the analysis following Sons of Gwalia.122 It is therefore arguable
that their entitlement to fairness (connoting similar treatment to unsecured creditors) is
judicially established in comparison to the notion of creditor reliance on capital reserves,
which exists as a mere presumption of doubtful influence.123 In addition, to the extent that
the concept of fairness is taken to encompass a moral element,124 it would seem even more
important that it should avail relief in the case of involuntary debt (that is, the defrauded
shareholders) compared with fairness based on commercial expediency (to wit, the general
creditors in whose favour normally voidable transactions are adjusted). Extending this
equitable treatment to accommodate the defrauded shareholders thus accords with the
same principle which enables creditors to adjust their own relationships, and would not
significantly distort existing insolvency processes or relative creditor positions within the
unsecured rank. Furthermore, it can be reconciled with an important rule of equity, namely
that, where trustees have made a fraudulent conveyance, the loss should fall on the
beneficiaries rather than on a bona fide purchaser for value.125
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Difficulties with implementing parity
It may be seen from the foregoing that, on the basis of corporate theory and the nature of
public policy, there are grounds for considering that the US legislature is content with the
alignment of the interests of unsecured creditors and injured investors and might not
respond to calls for it to resolve the apparent discord between the principle of mandatory
subordination and the effect of a Fair Funds distribution.126 This may be contrasted with
the swift action taken in Australia to enact an unequivocal rule. Many of the concerns
voiced relate to the manner in which the SEC or injured investors may adapt their behaviour
to maximise their recoveries.
For example, fears have been expressed that the SEC may become aggressive in its
pursuit of larger penalties, resulting in the decrease of assets available to general creditors,
where the penalties are sought from a company involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.127
These are reinforced by indications that the SEC has welcomed the Fair Funds provision as
an innovation which it can use “to return more funds to investors”.128 Black relies on
financial fraud settlements against four corporate defendants to demonstrate how the SEC’s
efforts to create Fair Funds distributions for investors have resulted in an evasion of the
disgorgement requirement and the imposition of sizeable penalties.129 Moreover, the shift
towards compensation as a goal of the SEC may have implications for the deterrence
objective of securities law enforcement, if the SEC pursues penalties that have a
compensatory effect but are inadequate for deterrence, or foregoes the collection of
penalties in situations where they cannot be used to compensate investors.130
Mass claims by investors to recover damages may also bring about a diminution in the
assets available to unsecured creditors, as noted by Callinan J in Sons of Gwalia: “It is not
difficult to imagine a situation in which claims of a large body of shareholders, perhaps
most of them, would dilute the creditors’ rights to a trickle.”131
In the context of Australian law, it was noted that class actions and litigation funding
might encourage this form of shareholder litigation, also to the detriment of the remaining
shareholders.132 Furthermore, any complications associated with such proceedings would
be multiplied in the event of the collapse of a corporate group.133
A matter which has received less attention, particularly in the context of the US where
the SEC as a regulatory body is empowered to redistribute its bankruptcy recoveries to
injured investors, is the extent to which these “sub-distributions” conform to the principles
of insolvency distribution. The potential for the SEC, in the context of bankruptcy
proceedings, to pursue policies which are not related to the accepted objectives of
insolvency law134 is most starkly reflected against the backdrop of the three possible
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interpretations that are associated with the mention of the pari passu principle,135 which
enforces pro rata distribution among unsecured creditors in insolvency. This “equality of
distribution” principle has been identified in the opening pages of this paper as operating
within the framework of absolute priority in US law, and accordingly may be examined
within the setting of more general observations relating to pari passu treatment.
The broadest view of the pari passu rule is one whereby it connotes the treatment of all
unsecured creditors equally and ignores any considerations pertaining to their individual
circumstances.136 This outlook is not represented in the SEC’s actions vis-à-vis Fair Funds
because it is empowered to set distribution criteria that are not objective in nature. The
courts, recognising the deterrent role of enforcement mechanisms such as disgorgement,
have deferred to “the experience and expertise of the SEC” in the line-drawing which
inevitably leaves out certain potential claimants.137 This line-drawing is as relevant for
seeing which parties are brought into the distribution process, as well as noting who is left
out: as seen in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom Inc. v SEC,138
shareholders may receive payment in priority to certain classes of creditors in the interests
of equalising their respective recoveries. This means that pre-insolvency payments to
creditors, which would not otherwise be subject to challenge, may nonetheless provide
grounds for excluding them from the SEC’s distribution. Furthermore, since the Fair Funds
proceeds may be distributed among “victims of [securities] violations”139 it is possible for
parties who had not acquired an interest in the debtor’s estate as shareholders, but were
nonetheless injured by the violations, to enjoy priority over non-defrauded shareholders.
This goes to the nature of the rights acquired before bankruptcy140 and, with respect to
personal actions, the upholding of remedies in tort over the contractual rights of creditors
and shareholders.
An alternative conception of pari passu treatment sees it as denoting no more than pro
rata distribution within classes.141 This is detracted from in the context of Fair Funds
insofar as experience has shown that the SEC may choose which parties to exclude in favour
of others. In terms of this second interpretation, in the normal bankruptcy hierarchy, non-
preferential unsecured creditors would together occupy one class and shareholders
another.142 By contrast, the SEC’s distribution methods permit it to select from either class
certain investors to benefit from the Fair Funds proceeds. This would be at the expense of
others who properly belong to those classes but who had made a profit on the sale of their
securities during the period in which the fraud occurred or recovered more than a given
percentage of their entitlements through the sale of their securities.143 Even though these
investors could have qualified as general unsecured creditors or shareholders, they may be
barred by the SEC from participation in the Fair Funds distribution for the benefit of the
non-profiting or non-recovering unsecured creditors and shareholders. The result is
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136 Mokal and Ho, “The pari passu principle”, n. 135 above; Bridge, “Collectivity”, n. 21 above, para. 1.2; In re
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140 Goode, Principles, n. 12 above, para. 3-02.
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142 Ibid; Wood, Law and Practice, n. 11 above, para. 1-14.
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therefore of differing treatment of general creditors inter se and shareholders among
themselves by effecting the dismantling of these recognised classes in insolvency. If we
accept that ranking in insolvency is indeed its most important feature, rather than the
achievement of equal treatment,144 in the context of the sub-distributions creditors or
shareholders cannot be guided by the prior knowledge that they would ordinarily have of
their place within the distribution structure. Thus, their rank (or mere participation in
distribution) is not determined with reference to negotiations conducted with the debtor ex
ante145 and in accordance with their respective bargains, but in the light of their position at
the time of distribution and relative to one another. Insofar as account is taken of profits or
recoveries already made by the time the SEC comes to disburse Fair Funds proceeds, the
ranking is coloured with a moral or ethical element which pari passu has been found to
lack.146 This disregards the possibility that at least some of the transactions may have been
entered into by the investors in ignorance of the fraud. Even where there is an awareness
of the fraud, it might not necessarily act as a check on pre-disgorgement transactions
between the debtor and investors: some may prefer to maximise the gains from the sale of
their securities than gamble on the uncertainty of the SEC’s discretion being exercised in
their favour. Thus, rather than producing deterrent effects for irregular or dishonest
activities, this form of ranking may be counter-productive for the SEC’s pooling of funds.
The entitlement of the SEC to distribute Fair Funds proceeds according to its discretion
also sits uneasily with the third facet of pari passu treatment, namely the principle of
collectivity.147 The collective nature of insolvency relates to the conservation of the estate
to ensure orderly distribution among creditors.148 Predictably therefore, the number of
ordinary unsecured creditors proving claims in the debtor’s insolvency determines the size
of their respective returns following payment of priority obligations. Collectivity
consequently carries a certainty of at least partial recovery for a creditor, with the
proportion being dependent upon the number of other parties participating in the sharing
of the estate. Conversely, in the disbursement of Fair Funds, it is settled that the standard
of fairness and reasonableness permits the SEC to take account of the limited funds
available for distribution in deciding which parties to exclude from payment under its
plan.149 Thus, the certainty of participation is absent for investors as the amount available
for payment influences the decision on who may benefit from the Fair Funds. The
distinction is clear: while for the purposes of collective treatment in insolvency it is
sufficient to be accepted as a creditor, qualifying as a victim of a securities violation does
not assure enjoyment of a share in Fair Funds.
A gap is therefore apparent between the normal course of an insolvency distribution
procedure and the manner in which the SEC fulfils its responsibilities for distribution of the
Fair Funds with respect to a company which is now insolvent. The readiness of other
jurisdictions to adopt the Fair Funds model may be tempered by the fresh imbalances which
parity seems to generate. These are briefly discussed in the concluding section of this paper.
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Does parity open up new imbalances?
The difficulty of squaring the parity brought about by Fair Funds with prevailing
conceptions of the notion of pari passu treatment have been highlighted in the preceding
section of this paper. Even if it could be aligned with the equality of distribution principle,
there are two important respects in which it may be seen as unsettling particular
shareholders and creditors.
The first, identified in literature on securities class actions, is the circularity problem.150
This occurs due to the shifting of wealth from the current shareholders of a corporation,
who indirectly bear the costs of any judgment or settlement against it, to the claimant
shareholders who acquired shares in the company at the material time.151 Coffee describes
a more complex form of wealth transfer, affecting diversified shareholders, in these terms:
Often shareholders will belong to both the plaintiff class that sues and the
residual shareholder class that bears the cost of the litigation. This can result
because they purchased stock at times that are both inside and outside the class
period, so that they are on both sides of the litigation. Thus, they are effectively
making wealth transfers to themselves, in effect shifting money from one pocket
to the other, minus the high transaction costs of securities litigation.152
Alternatively, if the shareholders of a company are not all similarly diversified, litigation
may bring into tension the interests of the “buy and hold” (small undiversified) investors
with those of the “in and out” (larger sophisticated) traders.153 Mitchell has decried the
notion of the “innocent shareholder”, portrayed as the rationally apathetic passive investors
from whom wealth is transferred in this way. He argues that shareholders’ participation in
the affairs of the company ensures the integrity of capital markets and is part of the
mechanism by which managerial frauds are deterred.154 This may be countered with the
observation that shareholders of a public corporation usually have little or no voice in the
selection of the managers or the way in which they conduct its affairs; large creditors are
likely to have much more control, especially as the company slides into insolvency.155 One
might also add that the “shareholder participation” argument does not answer the concerns
of individuals who hold shares indirectly through pension funds, unit trusts, or other
collective investments.156 They are not in a position to exert any significant influence over
the running of the company.
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Secondly, the debate regarding parity creates a danger of viewing all unsecured creditors
as contractual creditors, such as lenders and trade suppliers.157 Parity will also affect
creditors who have not bargained for risks on the same basis. While parity with non-
shareholder tort creditors may be wholly appropriate on the basis that both types of claim
are rooted in involuntary debt, in this context one must also have regard to the interests of
creditors, such as the revenue authorities, whose relationship with the debtor company is
not derived from a negotiated acceptance of risks. This is of particular significance in
countries where fiscal debts no longer enjoy preferential status, such as the UK. Insolvency
law reforms aimed at improving the position of unsecured creditors included the abolition
of Crown preference in all insolvencies – corporate and personal.158 A study recently
carried out by the Office of Fair Trading found that Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs was
owed more than £50,000 in 57 per cent of administrations and on average accounted for
24 per cent of unsecured debt.159 The justifications for parity may be somewhat
undermined, if it results in encroachment on other claims which merit repayment in the
wider public interest.
The potential for these distortions to result from an acceptance of parity underlines the
importance of clarifying who the “shareholders” and “unsecured creditors” are. That is to
say, it is difficult to assess the weight to be given to arguments for parity without knowing
whether the actual composition of these two groupings substantiates perceptions of their
relative power or vulnerability. No statistical breakdowns could be found regarding the
make-up of the unsecured creditor class,160 but studies of share ownership in the US and
Australia respectively reveal a great deal about the nature and extent of share investments
in the two countries. It is recorded that in the US in 2008, nearly half of all households
owned either equity or bonds.161 Depending on their age, the primary goals of investors
were saving for a home purchase and education (under 40s), saving for retirement (40–64
years) or generating current income (65 years and older).162 Having long-term investment
goals meant that most equity-owning households were not frequent traders, and had not
evidenced a pattern of buying and selling in response to the stock market conditions in
2007.163 These appear to be the buy-and-hold investors described in the wealth transfer
problem mentioned above, who indirectly bear the cost of judgments or settlements against
the company in favour of shorter-term investors. Furthermore, it was found that a large
number of investors had purchased their equities/bonds through professional financial
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advisers, rather than through retirement plans at work.164 Contrary to the perception of
modern shareholders being resourceful and more knowledgeable about the risks attached
to different share offerings,165 ownership of equities through professional advisers was
predominant across all investor groups, regardless of age, education level, household
income, etc.166 Most households that acquired equities through professional advisers were
shown to regularly rely on their advisers for investment advice and guidance.167 Likewise,
in Australia 41 per cent of the adult population owned shares in 2008, the main reasons for
investing being “to make money”; accumulate wealth; for long-term capital gains; and to
obtain higher returns.168 There was no marked pattern of frequent buying and selling:
between 2002 and 2008 the average value of share trades did not exceed 11 per cent of the
average value of monies invested.169 Australian investors could be distinguished from those
in the US by their use of the internet to buy shares, and the division of share-owners into
segments according to their level of knowledge/skill and passion for investing.170 A sharp
contrast may be drawn between the two countries and the UK where individual share
ownership levels have declined.171
The recognition that a significant number of investors are private individuals seeking to
raise funds to pay for their homes, make provision for education or secure their
retirement172 therefore adds another dimension to this debate. These parties may be
deemed to be in a comparable position to that of unsecured creditors, in that they are in
truth dealing with the company as outsiders, with similar limitations in their knowledge of
its business and matching expectations to be supplied with accurate information. The
studies detailing their long-term outlook on investment, infrequent trading activity, and
limited self-reliance in transacting on the market, indicate that their insight into the risks
attached to their investments is not as keen as it may be deemed to be.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to demonstrate how, as a matter of principle, grounds exist for
accepting parity as a response to modern conditions. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
manner and consequences of implementing such a policy require careful analysis. In
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practical terms, it may prove to be a token shift, given the fact that unsecured creditors often
make no recoveries on their claims.173 Furthermore, distributions aimed at compensating
injured investors will be difficult to reconcile with this long-standing interpretation of the
statutory pari passu rule:
. . . everybody shall be paid pari passu, but that means everybody after the
winding-up has commenced. It does not mean that the Court shall look into past
transactions, and equalise all the creditors by making good to those who have not
received anything a sum of money equal to that which other creditors have
received. It takes them exactly as it finds them, and divides the assets amongst
the creditors, paying them their dividend on their debts as they then exist.174
The US experience shows that the policies underlying investor protection, such as
deterrence and compensation, and a regulatory body’s power to enforce them, can sit
uneasily with the understanding of “equality of distribution” in an insolvency context. In
the UK, the Davies Review of Issuer Liability concluded that the question of subordinating
defrauded shareholder claims needed further investigation, noting that it raised important
general issues about the nature of equity investment in companies and the role of legal
capital.175 The growing correspondence between the positions of shareholders and
unsecured creditors highlighted in this paper should not convey the impression that the
incorporation of defrauded shareholder interests into the unsecured creditor class can be
achieved through a simple grafting-on process. It carries implications for the essence of the
insolvency distribution regime, and should accordingly be approached with care.
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